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“Disasters provide moments in which fractures and inequalities in 
society are exposed for all to see.”1 
 
“The true injustice of Harvey is that many of the people who have 
lost their homes and lives to Harvey are the same people who have 
had to live with the environmental degradation, polluted water and 




August 25, 2019 commemorated the second anniversary of 
Hurricane Harvey.3 It also marked the biennial of the start of the worst 
ever flood-producing storm in the United States.4 On August 25, 2017 
Harvey hit Houston and southeast Texas first as a Category 4 
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1 GORDON WALKR, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE—CONCEPTS, EVIDENCE AND 
POLITICS (2012). Walker’s contribution to the theory and practice of environmental 
justice highlights different justice concepts, and how these forms of justice play out 
in real situations such as Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. 
2 Rebecca Anderson, Hurricane Harvey: Ground Zero for Climate Justice, 
THE ACE BLOG (August 29, 2017), http://acespace.org/2017/08/29/hurricane-
harvey-ground-zero-for-climate-justice/. Anderson points out that some 
communities “are caught in a cycle of climate injustice, hit first with the plague of 
fossil fuel development in their backyards, and second by the carbon pollution that 
causes climate change-fueled disasters like Harvey.” 
3 Eric Berger, Harvey: This is probably the worst US flood storm ever; I’ll 
never be the same, SPACE CITY WEATHER (Aug. 25, 2018) (reprinted from August 
25, 2017), https://spacecityweather.com/harvey-almost-certainly-the-biggest-us-
flood-storm-of-all-time/; see also 2017 Hurricane Harvey, WORLD VISION 
https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/2017-hurricane-harvey-
facts. Harvey was the second most costly hurricane to hit the mainland. Katrina in 
2005 was the costliest. The death toll from the storm was 88. The death toll was 
low because the flooding was slow—it happened over several days. People were 
able to evacuate.  
4 Berger, supra note 3. 
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hurricane5 and continued with extreme tropical rainfall that dropped 
30 to 50 inches of rain on the region over five days.6 The rain triggered 
unprecedented flash and river flooding.7 This flooding damaged and 
destroyed homes and businesses, leaving some residents unable to get 
to work, or unemployed.8 The storm and its aftermath challenged 
residents’ physical and emotional well-being.9   
Harvey’s first anniversary in 2018 provided an opportunity for 
residents, nonprofit organizations, and government officials to take 
stock of the recovery. Harvey displaced 30,000 people and damaged 
or destroyed over 200,000 homes and businesses.10 One year after the 
storm, eight percent of the people Harvey impacted were still unable 
 
5 Saundra Brown, The Long Road to Recovery: Response and Rebuilding 
after Hurricane Harvey, 81 TEX. B.J. 242 (2018). In some areas, Harvey’s winds 
were close to 130 miles per hour.  
6 Berger, supra note 3. 
7 Michael Kimmelman, Lessons from Hurricane Harvey: Houston’s Struggle 
is America’s Tale, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/11/climate/houston-flooding-
climate.html. 
8 A. Mechele Dickerson, Hurricane Harvey and the Houston Housing 
Market, 96 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 102 (2018). Dickerson points out that renters, 
black, and Latinos were hard hit by Harvey. Workers could not get to work because 
their cars flooded, roads were impassable, or because their employers closed. 
Residents who could not get to work suffered income insecurity. Dickerson also 
points out that wealthier neighborhoods enjoyed better infrastructure, which meant 
water receded quickly and caused less mold damage than lower-income 
neighborhoods experience. Lower-income neighborhoods’ flood control systems 
are often ditches. These ditches overflowed, and water accumulated in homes. 
Finally, Dickerson points out that Houston officials built much of the city’s 
affordable and subsidized housing in designated flood zones.  
9 Berger, supra note 3. Berger points out that, for many people in Houston, 
Harvey will be a defining event in their lives; see also Isabella Masini, Hurricane 
Harvey’s Impact on Texas’ Vulnerable Population, 28 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 165, 168-75 (2018). Masini states that “[n]atural disasters 
disproportionately affected those who are in a lower socio-economic bracket.” She 
points out that low-income communities are also flood-prone areas near industrial 
facilities. Residents are unlikely to have insurance. They cannot repair their homes. 
They lack access to health care. Low-income residents are exposed to mold and 
additional hazardous substances. They are likely to suffer from asthma, chronic 
respiratory illnesses, gastrointestinal and skin infections, diabetes-related 
complications, cardiovascular disease, depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress 
disorder.  
10 Masini, supra note 9. 
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to return to their homes.11 Fifteen percent of the homes damaged by 
the storm were still unlivable.12 Resource-rich communities returned 
to normal relatively quickly, while communities of color and low-
income communities were still a mess one year later.13 
Harvey’s second anniversary presents an opportunity for legal 
scholars to engage in discernment about environmental justice and 
law. This discernment is important because it comes at a time when 
researchers are starting to release information about the links between 
contaminants dislodged by the storm and their effects on human 
health.14 In a climate change era, Harvey is likely to be one of several 
historic disasters that threaten the homes, livelihoods and lives of 
many, especially vulnerable residents of communities who already live 
with pollution and its effects. The purpose of this article is to examine 
Harvey, environmental justice, and federal and state law with the goal 
of finding ways to prepare citizens for future superstorms.  
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes Harvey and 
the post-hurricane rain and floods the storm triggered. This section 
then studies Harvey as an environmental justice narrative. Part II 
describes three key federal environmental statutes Congress enacted 
over thirty years ago and explores them in the Harvey context. This 
 
11 Brandon Formby, In Harvey’s Wake, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Aug. 23, 2018), 
http://www.texastribune.org/series/in-harveys-wake/. The Kaiser Family 
Foundation and the Episcopal Health Foundation surveyed 1,651 people from 24 
counties. Twenty-three percent said that Harvey worsened their financial situation 
and 17 percent said it lowered their quality of life. Among black Texans impacted 
by the storm, 60 percent said they are not getting the help they need. Forty percent 
of Hispanic respondents and 33 percent of white respondents were not getting 
needed help.  
12 Id. 
13 Danny Vinik, ‘People Just Give Up’: Low-Income Hurricane Victims Slam 
Federal Relief Programs, POLITICO (May 29, 2018), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/29/houston-hurricane-harvey-fema-597912  
(Vinik highlights residents’ lack of insurance and lack of awareness of FEMA 
rules. He also points out that language issues, bureaucracy, and contractor fraud 
made low-income residents give up.); see also Alexander C. Kaufman, Houston 
Flooding Always Hits Poor, Non-White Neighborhoods Hardest, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/houston-harvey-
environmental-justice_n_59a41c90e4b06d67e3390993.  
14 Christopher Flavelle, ‘Toxic Stew’ Stirred Up by Disasters Poses Long-
Term Danger, New Findings Show, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/climate/flooding-chemicals-health-
research.html.  
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section then examines and evaluates relevant state laws from the states 
most likely to experience hurricanes followed by flooding. Parts I and 
II tee up Part III, which offers concrete suggestions to promote positive 
change for vulnerable residents during and after extreme weather 
events. The Article ultimately contributes to conversations about how 
to empower communities to assert their rights before the next storm 
hits.15 
 
I. HARVEY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
 
A. Harvey  
 
Houston is a large,16 low-lying,17 sprawling18 city known for 
its lack of zoning regulations.19 The city has long favored business 
development over neighborhoods and people.20 Houston is also 
America’s petrochemical hub,21 with more than 450 plants and 
refineries sharing neighborhoods with Houstonians.22 These plants and 
refineries are well-known polluters that expose residents to a wide 
range of toxins and carcinogens. 
In August 2017, Hurricane Harvey swept in off the Gulf of 
Mexico to dump 24.5 trillion gallons of rainwater across Houston and 
southeast Texas.23 Although a hurricane is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, human-caused climate change can affect a storm’s 
 
15 Environmental & Climate Justice, NAACP, 
http://www.naacp.org/issues/environmental-justice/. 
16 Houston is America’s fourth largest city. 
17 Houston lies a few dozen feet above sea level. Berger, supra note 3. 
18 The Houston metropolitan area is 665 square miles. 
19 Kimmelman, supra note 7. 
20 William Fulton, Houston: From Sprawl to City, GOVERNING (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.governing.com/columns/urban-notebook/gov-houston-sprawl-
city.html. 
21 Jen Kirby, The Environmental Fallout of Hurricane Harvey, N.Y. MAG. 
(Sept. 2, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/09/the-environmental-
fallout-of-hurricane-harvey.html.  
22 Id. 
23 Rafael Aldon, Hurricane Harvey InsurTech Case Study; Visual 
Intelligence is Transforming Claim Response Times, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE 
(Sept. 19, 2017), http://towardsdatascience.com/hurricane-harvey-insurtech-case-
study-visual-intelligence-is-transforming-claim-response-times-3275042fbd8d. 
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intensity.24 Scientists have explained Harvey’s extraordinary rainfall 
by pointing out that Harvey stalled over Houston and southeast Texas 
for several days. The storm stalled because climate change created 
atmospheric conditions that stopped the storm from moving out of the 
area.25 
When rain falls in Houston, it should run into streams and 
rivers, through Galveston Bay, and ultimately to the Gulf of Mexico. 
With Harvey, rain fell so hard and fast that it created new rivers that 
washed over everything in their paths, spreading contamination from 
raw sewage and toxins.26 Polluted rivers became lakes that settled on 
neighborhoods.27 The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(“FEMA”) reported that nearly 80,000 homes had at least 18 inches of 
floodwater, and 23,000 of those had more than five feet.28 Harvey’s 
trail of devastation was exacerbated by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers’ decision to release water from two Houston area reservoirs 
on August 28th.29 The federal government designed these reservoirs, 
the Addicks and Barker, to protect downtown Houston.30 Both dams 
feed into the Buffalo Bayou, a slow-moving river that flows through 
the Houston Ship Channel into Galveston Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. 
When engineers eased pressure from the reservoirs by releasing 
rainwater, their action to protect downtown Houston caused flooding 
 
24 Berger, supra note 3. Berger says that “the moderately warmer-than-
normal Gulf of Mexico, almost certainly exacerbated the effects of the storm.” 
25 Id. In particular, with Harvey, a large low-pressure system moved into the 
Texas coast. This system brought significant moisture with it. Typically, when 
tropical storms become hurricanes, they have the ability to forge a steering current. 
Harvey was different. The storm collided with a ridge of high pressure and blocked 
the storm from moving. 
26 Michael D. Regan, Health Concerns Swirl in Texas Months After Harvey 




28 News Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Historic Disaster 
Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas, Sept. 22, 2017, available at 
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2017/09/22/historic-disaster-response-
hurricane-harvey-texas. For an overview of what FEMA does, see Dan Farber, 
How Disaster Response Works, LEGAL PLANET (Aug. 29, 2017), http://legal-
planet.org/2017/08/29/femas-role-in-disaster-response-its-not-what-you-think/. 
29 Berger, supra note 3. 
30 Id.  
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in homes that would not have flooded but for the release.31 Many 
residents were surprised, angered, and alarmed not only by the 
flooding itself,32 but also because they did not have flood insurance.33 
Some residents had no idea that their homes were flood-prone, so they 
never considered the need for flood insurance.34 
 
B. Environmental Justice  
 
Although Houston is one of the most racially diverse35 cities in 
the United States, at the neighborhood level, the city is stubbornly 
racially segregated.36 Although racial segregation in housing is illegal 
today,37 historic segregation still affects where Houstonians live now. 
 
31 Id. Berger points out that the Corps did not have good options. If the dam 
walls had failed, the Houston area would have experienced a release of a wall of 
water as much as 100 feet high. 
32 Juan A. Lozano, Trial to determine if government liable for Harvey 
flooding, AP NEWS (May 6, 2019), 
http://www.apnews.com/99f32a9b746b45d4a92e694a7f9aec68. Some people did 
not know their property lies inside reservoir boundaries. Most of the time, the land 
behind the dams looks like park land. Lozano points out that, “around the 
reservoirs, located about 20 miles west of downtown Houston, more than 10,000 
properties flooded. A portion of the land is on private property.” 
33 Dickerson, supra note 8. Homeowners lacked flood insurance for a number 
of reasons. It is expensive. Flood zone maps were outdated and/or inaccurate. 
Moreover, developers, realtors, and/or lenders told homeowners they did not need 
the insurance.  
34 Id. 
35 According to the U.S. Census 2000, the racial makeup of the city was 
49.3% White, 25.3% Black or African American, 0.4% Native American, 5.3% 
Asian, 0.2% Pacific Islander, 16.5% from other races, and 3.2% from two or more 
races; additionally, 37% of the population was Hispanic or Latino of any race. 
Since the 1990 Census, Houston's population has become majority-minority. 




36 John Henneberger, Houston, It’s Time to Stop Accommodating 
Segregation, SHELTERFORCE (Feb. 7, 2017), 
http://shelterforce.org/2017/02/07/houston-its-time-to-stop-accommodating-
segregation/. 
37 Kelly Haragan, Environmental Justice and the Anniversary of Hurricane 
Harvey, TEX. L. NEWS (Sept. 4, 2018), 
http://law.utexas.edu/news/2018/09/04/environmental-justice-and-the-anniversary-
of-hurricane-harvey/. 
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In the past, before Congress passed civil rights laws, government 
actors told citizens of color where they could purchase homes.38 Once 
neighborhoods were racially segregated, industries decided to place 
plants in low-come and communities of color.39 Once toxic industries 
moved into specific neighborhoods, demand for housing, as well as 
home prices, declined. Residents who live in these neighborhoods 
cannot afford to move.40  
Environmental justice is a movement41 that calls attention to 
inequalities low-income and communities of color experience with 
regard to the environment.42 This movement also urges policymakers 
to ensure that polluting industries pay the costs of the pollution they 
generate, rather than pass these costs to communities and taxpayers.43 
Climate justice44 extends the environmental justice movement, 
 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 For a history of the environmental justice movement in the United States, 
see Jedediah Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
809 (2018) (documenting the movement’s thirty-year history); see also Christopher 
Ibrahim, Environmental Justice as a Growing Movement: A Look at United States 
Domestic Policies and Efforts to Address Environmental Burdens on Lower-
Income Communities, 18 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (Apr. 20, 2018) 
(highlighting state legislation and task forces focusing on environmental justice 
issues). 
42 Haragan, supra note 37. See also WALKER, supra note 1, at 148. Walker 
breaks down three forms of justice--distributive, procedural, and justice as 
recognition. Distributive justice highlights the distributions of goods and bads (e.g., 
those losing jobs were predominantly poor and black). Procedural justice refers to 
access to information, participation in decision-making (e.g., the lack of 
information on toxicity risks from flood water. Justice as recognition means patters 
of respect, stigmatization, discrimination (e.g., the racist history of housing 
development in the city). 
43 Id. 
44 See HENRY SHUE, CLIMATE JUSTICE—VULNERABILITY AND PROTECTION 
(2014) (Shue points out that climate change constitutes an unprecedented challenge 
for human civilization. He is especially concerned about ethics, human rights, and 
how to protect the most vulnerable in our societies.); see also DOMINIC ROSER & 
CHRISTIAN SEIDEL, CLIMATE JUSTICE—AN INTRODUCTION (2017) (Roser & Seidel 
guide readers through moral issues that surround climate change, especially how 
we should distribute the burden of climate action between industrialized and 
developing countries); see also DAVID NAGUIB PELLOW, WHAT IS CRITICAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE? (2018) (Pellow introduces a new framework for 
critically analyzing Environmental Justice scholarship and activism. For example, 
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modifying it to highlight the unequal burdens climate change imposes 
on low-income communities and communities of color.  
Environmental justice advocates sometimes call 
neighborhoods contaminated with chemical pollutants sacrifice 
zones.45 In Houston, some neighborhoods became sacrifice zones 
when they became hosts to toxic facilities.46 It is possible that 
businesses found that low-income and minority communities are less 
likely than wealthier communities to resist new, polluting neighbors.47 
The end result is that some communities experience health hazards on 
normal days.48 Superstorms and their aftermaths add and compound 
dangers.49 
Harvey dumped rain on everyone and everything in Houston 
and southeast Texas. Flooding started right away.50 With Harvey, 
 
he explains how the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States relates to 
the environmental justice movement.). 
45 STEVE LERNER, SACRIFICE ZONES—THE FRONT LINES OF TOXIC 
CHEMICAL EXPOSURE IN THE UNITED STATES (2010). Lerner repurposed a Cold 
War term coined by U.S. government officials to designate areas contaminated 
with radioactive pollutants generated by nuclear weapon manufacturing. For more 
information about environmental justice, see ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND 
THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR (2011) (Nixon, Rachel Carson Professor of 
English, examines writers who advocate for environmental justice for the poor in 
the global South. He highlights writers who environmental health and social justice 
through a humanities lens.). 
46 DORCETA E. TAYLOR, TOXIC COMMUNITIES—ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, 
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION, AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY (2014). Taylor, a professor 
in the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of Michigan, 
explores environmental racism. She explores “why certain communities host toxic 
facilities and why certain populations are more likely to live in close proximity to 
those facilities.” Taylor examines the link between entrenched segregation and 
zoning ordinances that privilege wealthier communities. She also considers the 
possibility that businesses have found the paths of least resistance in low-income 
and minority communities. See also NAACP, supra note 15. The NAACP points 
out the race (not class) is the number one indicator for the placement of toxic 
facilities in the United States.   
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Flavelle, supra note 14. 
50 WALKER, supra note 1, at 129-30. Walker explains that floods “are events 
that happen when water moves and accumulates unusually. He also points out that 
“[t]he determination of where floods become problematic—where they interact 
with and damage things that are valued—is down to human processes of 
establishing settlements, building infrastructure, growing crops and so on, and the 
ways that water flows are channeled, directed and resisted.” 
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human actions and inactions meant that flooding affected people and 
places differently.51 For example, people in some communities created 
sophisticated infrastructure layouts that lessened the impact of the 
flooding.52 In contrast, individuals in other communities offered flood 
planning that consisted of a series of ditches.53 Floods interact with 
people in distinctive phases: “pre-flood preparedness, to warning, 
evacuation (in some cases), to the flood period, to recovery and living 
with the aftermath, through to rebuilding and restitution.”54 Each phase 
tests individuals’ and groups’ resistance55 and resilience.56  
Additionally, inequity and injustice are at issue in each phase, 
determining “who is prepared, who is warned, who evacuates, who is 
killed, who suffers the worst health effects and damages, who is best 
able to recover and who gets to rebuild.”57  
Harvey matters because it puts a spotlight on environmental 
and climate injustice. Harvey and its aftermath shows what happens 
when society subjects low-income and communities of color to greater 
environmental hazards and fewer societal benefits than more 
privileged segments of society experience.58 Harvey also shows the 
cycle of fossil fuel damage.59 Low-income and communities of color 
live in the shadow of petrochemical plants and experience pollution on 
a daily basis. Then, when climate-induced weather events strike, they 
experience an acute crisis.60 In essence,61 environmental regulations 
 
51 Id. Resilience is “the ability to cope with or adapt to hazard stress, 
encompassing preparedness and process of relief, rescue and recovery.”  
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 135. Resistance is “the capacity of an individual or a group to 
withstand the impact of a hazard.” 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 129-30. 
58 Haragan, supra note 39. 
59 NAACP, supra note 15. 
60 Carmin Chappell, Climate Change in the US Will Hurt Poor People the 
Most, According to a Bombshell Federal Report, CNBC (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/26/climate-change-will-hurt-poor-people-the-most-
federal-report.html. 
61 Laurel Blatchford, Climate Change Disproportionately Affects Low-
Income Communities, ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/climate-change-disproportionately-
affects-low-income-communities. 
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“do little to safeguard the well-being of those who live in the shadow 
of heavy industry and cannot afford to move to a safer location.”62 
 
II. HARVEY AND THE LAW 
 
A. Three Federal Laws 
 
There are three federal statutes especially relevant to the issue 
of mitigating and cleaning up after the effects of storms such as 
Harvey: the Clean Air Act (“CAA”);63 the Clean Water Act (“CWA”); 
64and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).65  
 
1. THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
 
The CAA was passed by Congress in 1963,66 predating the 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) by 
seven years.67 The original purpose of the CAA was to establish a 
federal program within the U.S. Public Health Service to research 
techniques for monitoring and controlling air pollution.68 The modern 
form of the CAA originated in 1970 when the statute was amended to 
authorize the creation of federal and state regulations limiting 
emissions from industrial and mobile (i.e., cars, planes, trains, etc.) 
sources, as well as expand enforcement authority.69 While the CAA 
 
62 LERNER, supra note 47 at 298, 314. Lerner points out that “we live in a 
nation divided by pollution exposure levels.” 
63 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq (2015). 
64 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq (2015).  
65 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq (2015). 
66 Evolution of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY [EPA], 
http://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act.  
67 Id. 




69 EPA, supra note 65. 
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was not the first federal environmental statute, it is often considered 
innovative in its federal enforcement of environmental standards.70 
 
2. THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
 
Following the passage of the CAA, the CWA was enacted in 
1972.71 As its name suggests, the CWA focuses on maintaining the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the United 
States.72 In a similar manner to the CAA, the CWA grants the EPA the 
authority to institute and enforce regulations that limit industrial 
pollution in protected waters.73 The CWA has made highly positive 
contributions to the environment74 and has moved us far away from 
the burning rivers of the 1960s.75 However,  a substantial portion of 
the nation’s waters continue to violate the CWA’s water quality 
standards.76  
 
3. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, 
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT 
 
The third statute—and perhaps the most relevant to Harvey and 
its cleanup—is CERCLA, which lawyers often refer to as the 
Superfund Law.77 CERCLA was passed in 1980 in response to 
 
70 David M. Driesen, Thomas M. Keck and Brandon T. Metroka, Half a 
Century of Supreme Court Clean Air Act Interpretation: Purposivism, Textualism, 
Dynamism, and Activism, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781 (2018). 
71 History of the Clean Water Act, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/history-clean-water-act. 
72 33 U.S.C. §1251(a) (2015). 
73 History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 70.  
74 William L. Andreen and Shana Campbell Jones, The Clean Water Act: A 
Blueprint for Reform, CRP WHITE PAPER 802 (2008). 
75 Mark Urycki, 50 Years Later: Burning Cuyahoga River Called Poster 
Child for Clean Water Act, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (2019), 
http://www.npr.org/2019/06/18/733615959/50-years-later-burning-cuyahoga-river-
called-poster-child-for-clean-water-act. The Cuyahoga River caught fire in 
Cleveland when sparks from a passing train ignited oil-soaked debris that was 
floating on the water’s surface. Journalists captured dramatic images that inspired 
environmental reform. 
76 National Summary of State Information, EPA, 
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control. 
77 Superfund: CERCLA Overview, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-
cercla-overview. 
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concerns surrounding hazardous waste sites across the country and is 
intended to facilitate their cleanup.78 CERCLA allows the EPA and 
state agencies to cast a wide net when searching for parties responsible 
(and therefore liable) for causing these sites to become hazardous.79 
These parties include past and present generators and transporters of 
hazardous materials to the site, as well as current and sometimes past 
owners of the site.80 However, even with such a wide array of 
potentially responsible parties, tracking down polluters often proved 
difficult. Hence, the Superfund was established to pay for the cleanup 
of “orphan” sites by taxing the chemical and petroleum industries.81 
This tax has since expired, but CERCLA continues to be funded by 
appropriations by Congress.82 
Under CERCLA, there are two responses to a hazardous 
substance release or the threat thereof: removal actions and remedial 
actions.83 Removal actions are short-term, temporary efforts aimed at 
curtailing immediate harm.84 Examples of removal actions include 
putting up security fencing or otherwise restricting access, temporary 
evacuation and relocation of threatened individuals, and provision of 
alternative water supplies in the case of contaminated waters.85 
Remedial actions seek to permanently resolve the danger and take 
place after the initial threat has been abated.86 Remedial actions require 
careful study to determine how to solve the issue best, and they can 
take place years after the hazardous release occurred.87 In the 
immediate aftermath of a hurricane such as Harvey, citizens and 
government actors need to place affected sites on the National 
 
78 Thomas C. Voltaggio and John Adams, Superfund: A Half Century of 




81 Superfund: CERCLA Overview, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cercla-overview. 
82 Robin Kundis Craig, Cleaning Up Our Toxic Coasts: A Precautionary and 
Human Health-Based Approach to Coastal Adaptation, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 
39-69 (2018). 
83 Jerry L. Anderson and B. Kip Shelby, Classification of CERCLA Response 
Actions as Removal or Remedial. 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10659-64 (1993). 
84 Id. 
85 42 U.S.C. §9601(23) (2015).  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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Priorities List (“NPL”) to ensure that the EPA makes clean-up a 
priority.88 
 
4. CERCLA IN THE CONTEXT OF HARVEY 
 
A. Federal Laws 
 
There are sixteen Superfund sites in Harris County,89 the 
county in which Houston lies. When Harvey hit Houston, thirteen of 
these sites were flooded, spreading toxic chemicals across parts of the 
city.90 To this day, some of the homes contaminated by the noxious 
waters remain unsafe to live in.91 Certainly, the damage could have 
been worse. The EPA had taken precautions to protect Superfund sites 
from flooding.92 A 2012 risk assessment conducted by the EPA 
identified Superfund sites that could be put at risk due to climate 
change and rising sea levels93—e.g., those within immediate proximity 
to the coastline. The EPA’s Climate Change Adaption Plan adopted in 
2014 laid out a strategy to protect these sites from climate change-
related flooding.94 However, the assessment did not—and perhaps 
could not—predict the unprecedented amount of precipitation that 
deluged Houston during Harvey.95 Several Superfund sites located just 
outside of the floodplains considered to be at risk were damaged and 
their toxic contents were spread by floodwaters.96 In other words, 
 
88 For a discussion of the use of removal actions, see Non-Critical Time 
Removal Actions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/non-time-critical-removal-
actions. 
89 Climate issues related to Hurricane Harvey, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE LAW (Aug. 31 2017), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2017/08/31/climate-law-issues-
related-to-hurricane-harvey/. 
90 Brie Sherwin, After the Storm: The Importance of Acknowledging 
Environmental Justice in Sustainable Development and Disaster Preparedness,  
29 DUKE ENVTL. LAW & POLICY FORUM 2, 273-300 (2019). 
91 Id. at 275. 
92 Superfund climate resistance, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-climate-resilience#impacts. 
93 SABIN CTR., supra note 87. 
94 Superfund climate resistance, supra note 90. 
95 SABIN CTR., supra note 87. 
96 Darryl Fears and Brady Dennis, Houston’s Polluted Superfund Sites 
Threaten to Contaminate Floodwaters, WASH. POST (2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
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hazardous sites located within floodplains certainly need extra 
investment and protection, but these areas are not the only ones that 
pose a widespread health risk when storms like Harvey hit. Given the 
commonly accepted outlook regarding our climatic future,97 sites 
further inland may need more attention than we think. 
Harvey was a uniquely devastating storm. However, the 
realities of climate change may ensure that storms like Harvey are no 
longer such an anomaly. In the period from 1981 to 2000, a storm with 
Harvey’s magnitude had an annual probability of about 1%.98 By 2081 
to 2100, this figure is expected to increase to about 18%.99 Storms like 
Harvey are going to become less of an “if” and more of a “when,”100 
and steps need to be taken to prevent future environmental devastation. 
At the federal level, CERCLA, the CAA, and the CWA all provide 
methods of mitigating the effects of Harvey-like storms. Although the 
newest of these laws was passed almost 40 years ago, they can still 
prove useful in combating modern problems. 
The statute that most directly addresses this issue is CERCLA, 
as it focuses on cleaning up hazardous sites before they pose a 
widespread health threat.101 Despite the Trump administration’s 
proposals to drastically cut the EPA’s budget,102 Congress 
appropriated nearly $1.1 billion to the Superfund in 2019, with 
included funds to be granted to state and tribal governments to aid in 
their own cleanup efforts.103 Indeed, state and local actors can often 
 
environment/wp/2017/08/29/houstons-flood-threatens-to-turn-polluted-superfund-
sites-into-a-toxic-gumbo/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a5ed02938107. The average 
distance between Superfund sites and similar hazardous areas to the floodplains 
was 44 feet. Id. 
97 John Cook, Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming 
in the Scientific Literature, ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS (June 2013) (finding that 
97 percent of scientific articles that addressed anthropogenic global warming 
agreed that the warming is real and is caused by human activity and that 96 percent 
of scientists “who authored papers expressing a view on [anthropogenic global 
warming] . . . endorsed the consensus.”). 
98 Kerry Emanuel, Assessing the Present and Future Probability of Hurricane 
Harvey’s Rainfall, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES, 114(48), 12681-84 (2017). 
99 Id. at 12681. 
100 Id. at 12681-84. 
101 Anderson & Shelby, supra note 81. 
102 Craig, supra note 80, at 42. 
103 FY 2019 EPA budget in brief, EPA (2019), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-02/documents/fy-2019-epa-bib.pdf. 
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prove invaluable in the cleanup of Superfund sites because of their 
unique understanding and attachment to the sites within their 
respective purviews.104 
CERCLA contains one provision in particular that is especially 
relevant to the discussion of Harvey: the Emergency Planning & 
Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”). EPCRA came about 
when CERCLA was amended in 1986 with the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”).105 EPCRA requires 
state governors to create an emergency response commission for their 
states.106 These state commissions then split their respective states into 
emergency planning districts and designate local committees for each 
district.107 Each committee develops and maintains an emergency 
response plan for any facility in the district that handles a certain 
amount of “extremely hazardous substances.”108 These plans identify 
these facilities and the routes they use to transport hazardous 
substances, describe on-site and off-site emergency response 
procedures, and designate a facility coordinator and a community 
coordinator to execute the plan.109 Each chemical facility within a 
district must provide the committee with information necessary to 
create their plan, and they must immediately notify the committee 
when a hazardous substance is released into the environment.110 
 
Although this seems like a substantial sum of money, it represents a downward 
trend from the $2 billion appropriated in 1999 and is far from enough to properly 
address the issue of cleaning Superfund sites. See Superfund: trends in federal 
funding and cleanup of EPA’s nonfederal national priorities list sites (2015), U.S. 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672734.pdf 
104 Craig, supra note 81, at 44-45, 48. 
105 Summary of the Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act, 
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-emergency-planning-
community-right-know-act. 
106 Lauren Mulhern, The Arkema Chemical Facility Incident: How the 
Regulation of Reactive Chemicals and the Incorporation of Climate Change Risks 
in Emergency Response Planning Could Mitigate and Prevent Future Accidental 
Chemical Releases, COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 30, 143 
(2019). 
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However, not all facilities fully comply with these requirements, which 
can lead to public health disasters such as the Arkema plant incident.111 
The Arkema chemical plant, located about twenty miles 
northeast of Houston, manufactures organic peroxides, a type of 
chemical used in the manufacture of plastics.112 These organic 
peroxides must be kept cool or else they can react violently, resulting 
in a fire or explosion.113 When Harvey was approaching Houston, all 
205 individuals within a 1.5-mile radius of the facility were evacuated 
out of fear that the refrigeration trailers housing the chemicals would 
lose power and explode.114 A small crew of twelve Arkema employees 
remained at the plant to maintain the trailers as long as possible.115 On 
August 29, the power at the plant went out, the refrigeration failed, and 
the trailers began to ignite, spreading toxic fumes within and outside 
the evacuation perimeter.116 
Although Arkema was obligated under ECPRA to announce 
these releases to emergency responders, they neglected to do so.117 As 
a result, multiple individuals, including twenty-one emergency 
responders, were caught off-guard and exposed to the gas cloud; these 
individuals later exhibited signs of chemical exposure.118 In addition 
to the gas cloud, floodwaters carried wastewater from the facility 
throughout the area.119 Those injured by exposure to the gas cloud and 
toxic waters filed a class action suit against Arkema in October 
2017.120 The Arkema incident illustrates that when firms eschew their 
obligations under environmental statutes and/or do not plan for the 
storms of the future, the lives of innocent and unknowing people can 
be severely impacted. 
 
111 Id. 
112 Investigation report: organic peroxide decomposition, release, and fire at 
Arkema Crosby following Hurricane Harvey flooding, U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND 






117 Mulhern, supra note 104. 
118 CSB, supra note 110. 
119 Id. 
120 Class Action Complaint, Shannan Wheeler v. Arkema France, No. 4:17-
cv-02960, (D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017). 
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Along with CERCLA, the CAA and CWA can be used to 
prevent environmental hazards in both direct and indirect ways. 
Directly, the acts impose regulations and limits on industrial pollution, 
as previously discussed. These regulations hold firms and other private 
actors accountable for polluting the air and waters. All states have their 
own agencies governing their environments;121 the one most relevant 
to Harvey and Houston is the Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality (“TCEQ”). While these state regulators can be effective at 
enforcing rules during times of calm, they sometimes fail at holding 
polluters accountable during and after a disaster.122 Addressing this 
deficiency is where the indirect impact of the CAA and CWA show 
themselves in the form of citizen lawsuits. The CAA123 and CWA124 
both contain provisions that allow citizens to sue private and public 
violators of the acts.  
Citizen lawsuits allow individuals harmed by pollution to make 
themselves whole through federal statutes when their state or locality 
offers them no such protection. But perhaps the most important aspect 
of citizen lawsuits is their ability to act as a deterrent to 
environmentally irresponsible behavior.125 The looming threat of 
being sued post-disaster for pollution spilled during a storm may be 
enough to spur some firms into taking extra pre-disaster precautions.126 
Additionally, preemptive lawsuits—i.e., filing suit long before a 
disaster occurs—by concerned citizens could also be a useful tool for 
compelling firms to clean up now before it is too late.127 One example 
 
121 Health and Environmental Agencies of U.S. States and Territories, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/home/health-and-environmental-agencies-us-states-and-
territories. 
122 Immediately following the Harvey disaster, Governor Abbott of Texas 
suspended many of the TCEQ’s rules regarding air and water pollution, allowing 
firms to get away with pollution that they would otherwise be penalized for. The 
suspension was lifted in April 2018. See Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality, Request for Suspension of TCEQ Rules (Aug. 28, 2017), 
http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/response/hurricanes/suspension-of-tceq-
rules-8.28.17.pdf. 
123 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012). 
124 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
125 RCRA as a Tool for Environmental Justice Communities and Others to 
Compel Climate Change Adaptation, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2409 (2018). While this 
article focuses on suing under RCRA, a different environmental statute, the same 
motivations and principles apply when suing under the CAA or CWA. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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of this kind of lawsuit is Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., currently being heard in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts.128 The suit concerns an ExxonMobil 
terminal located north of Boston that has leaked carcinogenic 
chemicals into nearby waterways in the past.129 The Conservation Law 
Foundation (“CLF”) is arguing that, as things currently stand, climate 
change will bring about storms that will inevitably cause the 
ExxonMobil terminal to spill chemicals and violate the CWA.130 Thus, 
ExxonMobil must make adaptive changes to prevent these future 
spills.131 This suit represents a new way to utilize the CWA and could 
serve as the framework for suits to be filed by Harvey victims.132 
 
B. State Laws 
  
The citizen suit provisions of the CAA and CWA can be 
powerful tools for victims of pollution following a natural disaster. 
Unfortunately, in some states, they may be the only practical tools 
available to victims, despite the existence of state laws that at first 
glance, might give the appearance that they would be helpful in natural 
disasters. The five states most affected by hurricanes, in descending 
order, are Florida, Texas, North Carolina, Louisiana, and South 
Carolina.133 Louisiana134 and Florida135 each have environmental 
statutes similar to the CAA and CWA and that contain citizen suit 
provisions. The primary limits to the Louisiana statute are that a citizen 
cannot sue prior to thirty days after notifying the secretary of 
 
128 Thomas Landers, A New Path to Climate Justice, Adaptation Suits Against 
Private Entities, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2018). 
129 Id. 
130 Complaint at 21, Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. ExxonMobil 
Corporation, No. 1:16-CV-11950 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2016). 
131 Id. For a thorough review of the ExxonMobil case, see Landers, supra 
note 126. 
132 Sebastien Malo, Hurricane Harvey’s Aftermath Could See Pioneering 
Climate Change Lawsuits, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2017), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-harvey-climatechange/hurricane-harveys-
aftermath-could-see-pioneering-climate-lawsuits-idUSKCN1BG2NI. 
133 Chris Landsea, How many direct hits by hurricanes of various categories 
have affected each state? NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., June 19, 2019, 
http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/E19.html. 
134 30 LA. STAT. § 2026. 
135 10 FLA. STAT. § 120.69(1)(b). 
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Louisiana’s environmental agency and alleged violator,136 and a 
citizen cannot sue if said environmental agency is already prosecuting 
the alleged violator.137 
Florida shares these requirements (with the notification period 
set to sixty days)138, as well as the conditions that any citizen suits file 
in the name of the state139 and the state has the right to intervene and 
take over the case.140 South Carolina’s Pollution Control Act (“PCA”) 
had a citizen suit provision until a bill was passed that eliminated the 
provision from the Act.141 The bill, however, contained a clause that 
allowed citizens to sue for pollution that occurred prior to the bill’s 
passage.142 Two bills that have each been passed by one of South 
Carolina’s legislative bodies threaten to prevent all PCA citizen suits, 
including those for pre-2012 pollution.143 The environmental statutes 
of North Carolina144 and Texas145 lack citizen suit provisions as well. 
However, Texas does a have system in place for state prosecution of 
polluters based on information provided by private citizens.146 
The lack of citizen suit provisions in three of the five states 
most likely to be affected by hurricanes, further underscores the 
importance of federal rules such as the CAA and CWA. While each of 
these states has an agency with the authority to sue polluters, it is 
unrealistic to assume that a state could address each case in a timely 
manner, especially when considering budget cuts147 and a reduction in 
federal EPA actions against polluters.148 It may also be the case that 
 
136 30 LA. STAT. § 2026(b)(1). 
137 Id. at § 2026(b)(2). 
138 10 FLA. STAT. § 120.69(1)(b)(i). 
139 Id. at § 120.69(1)(b)(ii)(c). 
140 Id. at § 120.69(1)(b)(ii)(d). 
141 S.C. Gen. Assemb. H4654, 119th Sess. (2012). 
142 Id. 
143 S.C. Gen. Assemb. H3925, 120th Sess., 2013-2014 (2013) (a House bill) 
and S.C. Gen. Assemb. S229, 121st Sess., 2015-2016 (2016) (a Senate bill). 
144 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A. 
145 See generally 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. 
146 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 70.4. 
147 Marie Cusick, Cash-strapped State Environmental Agencies Brace for 
Budget Cuts, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (2017),  
http://www.npr.org/2017/04/11/523450904/cash-strapped-state-environmental-
agencies-brace-for-budget-cuts 
148 Eric Lipton and Danielle Ivory, Under Trump, E.P.A. has Slowed Actions 
against Polluters, and put Limits on Enforcement Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 
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state governments simply have little interest in holding polluters 
accountable at all following a disaster. 
 
III. HOW TO CREATE A MORE JUST, LEGALLY SOUND FUTURE 
 
A. Recommendation One: Promote resilience in vulnerable 
communities  
 
Responding to climate change disasters using justice and legal 
principles is a dynamic process.149 Resilience is “the ability to cope 
with or adapt to hazard stress.”150 With regard to resilience, promoting 
everyone’s resilience is a good idea, and is vital for vulnerable 
communities. Gordon Walker’s 2012 work, Environmental Justice—
Concepts, Evidence and Politics, provides an excellent framework for 
thinking about how to define resilience because he studied Katrina a 
justice context.151  
First, Walker begins his resilience analysis by highlighting pre-
flooding preparedness. In particular, he suggests that communities 
must make preparedness effective for everyone. When communities 
enact awareness programs and create emergency plans, they must 
factor in differences such as language and capability to act.152 In the 
Harvey context, communities must consider the needs of Spanish-
speaking residents.  
Second, Walker highlights warning and evacuation processes. 
Communities must design warnings and evacuation processes in ways 
that consider everyone, including residents who lack access to 
communication technologies. He reminds us that some people will 
need more assistance than others, especially elderly and/or disabled 
community members.153  
Third, Walker points out that emergency services and other 
agencies must be committed to equality. They cannot discriminate. 
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including affordable, safe housing and access to health care.154 Finally, 
Walker makes it clear that recovery cannot happen unless people can 
remain employed, with a stable income.155 He also urges communities 
to provide universal access to flood insurance.156 With incomes and 
insurance, residents will be able to “re-establish their homes in a more 
flood-proof condition, or to move elsewhere if they wish.”157 All of 
these suggestions will help Houston-area communities and are worth 
pursuing before the next storm hits. 
 
B. Recommendation Two: Advocate for climate change 
updates to CERCLA  
 
Government agencies need to hold companies accountable for 
the damage they cause. Firms respond best when the cost of failing to 
respond is high. Right now, firms experience no real consequences 
when they hide information about what chemicals they have released 
during and after a disaster. Therefore, the most effective way to ensure 
transparency is to amend the EPCRA to add a new, significant criminal 
penalty for first that fail to report toxic releases to emergency 
responders as the act mandates. A further amendment to the EPCRA 
could provide that anyone injured as a result of a company’s failure to 
report a toxic release from a natural disaster to emergency responders 
are entitled to bring a civil action for their injuries. This amendment 
should allow for treble damages. The amendments this article suggests 
give teeth to the EPCRA’s emergency reporting requirements, thereby 
increasing transparency. 
 
C. Recommendation Three: Use data to establish links 
between exposure to specific toxins and health 
consequences 
 
Individuals and communities should be able to look at a 
website to see which chemicals, in what quantities, a specific storm 
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about which toxins are in people’s bodies at defined points after a 
storm, and outline the health effects of specific contaminants.159 
Additionally, the website would share information about whether 
specific contaminants can accumulate with each storm.160 Finally, the 
website would include information about which facilities emit which 
chemicals and contaminants.161 Researchers have already started on a 
path to make data-driven transparency a reality.162 Medical researchers 
are gathering and analyzing data.163 Data scientists are making clear 
that data collection has the potential to become a powerful tool.164 Data 
scientists can use data to ask powerful questions, and additionally, data 
can be used to predict and plan for the real effects of storms.165 
Communities groups, governmental bodies and officials, and 
journalists can also all use data to encourage polluting industries to 




As environmental injustice evolves with climate change, 
environmental advocates must work with vulnerable communities to 
establish empowering strategies and priorities. We do not yet know the 
full reality of climate change. One scientist has stated that climate 
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Policymakers, lawmakers, citizens, and companies can take action to 
counter this dire prediction. They can lessen the likelihood of creating 
even more concentrated human suffering than what already exists. 
This Article has suggested action items for a range of stakeholders to 
work on now. Each recommendation assumes that policymakers, 
lawmakers, and citizens have everything to gain by working to (1) 
increase resilience for all (and especially for vulnerable communities), 
(2) amend federal law to promote prevention, clean-up and 
accountability, and (3) use data to support environmental justice goals. 
Let’s leave something positive in Harvey’s wake−increased justice and 
improved laws. 
 
 
 
